Antitrust Law, Immunity, and Medical Peer Review Boards by Biebuyck, Valerie S.
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 37 Number 3 Article 11 
10-1-1988 
Antitrust Law, Immunity, and Medical Peer Review Boards 
Valerie S. Biebuyck 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Medical Jurisprudence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Valerie S. Biebuyck, Antitrust Law, Immunity, and Medical Peer Review Boards, 37 Buff. L. Rev. 831 (1988). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol37/iss3/11 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
Antitrust Law, Immunity, and Medical Peer
Review Boards
I. INTRODUCTION
The medical profession has undergone a subtle yet dramatic evolu-
tion that has distinctly affected the manner in which doctors perceive
themselves. This change is nowhere more evident than in the realm of
medical peer review, where physician self-regulation has given way to
legislative mandates which delineate the bounds of such regulatory activ-
ities, and the entire peer review process is subject to the scrutiny of anti-
trust law. Recent cases have focused attention on the extent to which
medical peer review boards are, or should be, subject to federal antitrust
liability. These developments and their implications for both physicians
and patients are the subject of this Comment.
The recent Supreme Court decision in Patrick v. Burget epitomizes
what many physicians perceive to be an infuriating irony: while attempt-
ing to obey a state mandate to expel fellow physicians deemed incompe-
tent to practice medicine,. a group of doctors was found to have engaged
in illegal anticompetitive behavior when one such physician was ousted
from their midst.1 The specific circumstances of the Patrick case will be
examined at length below. For now, it suffices to point out that although
the holding must be narrowly construed as an interpretation of only one
specific state statute, the case highlights the tensions amidst which peer
review boards must try to function.
Generally comprised of staff physicians and hospital administrators,
peer review boards evaluate the credentials of potential staff members to
determine if privileges should be extended to them. The boards also as-
sess the performance of current staff members to determine whether
these individuals are entitled to a continued grant of privileges.2 Any
time a negative decision is rendered against the subject of a review, such
boards become vulnerable to allegations of anticompetitive activity.
Primarily two groups have been responsible for bringing such suits.
The first consists of individual physicians whose professional access to
1. 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988), rev'g 800 F.2d 1498 (9th Cir. 1986).
2. Enders, Federal Antitrust Issues Involved in the Denial of Medical Staff Privileges, 17 LOY.
U.L.J. 331-32 (1986).
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hospitals has been revoked or barred. The second group is comprised of
allied health professionals (such as chiropractors, nurse-midwives, nurse-
anesthetists, podiatrists, and psychologists) who have been prohibited
from treating their patients in and using hospital facilities.4 Disgruntled
health-care providers may aver that members of the board engaged in an
anticompetitive conspiracy against them in violation of the Sherman Act,
and thereby expose the peer review board to a lengthy and expensive
antitrust suit.
Several developments have converged to focus the spotlight on phy-
sician peer review. Hospital admitting privileges have become increas-
ingly important in recent years because the practice of medicine is now
highly specialized and replete with sophisticated technology. The impor-
tance of admitting privileges varies depending on the type of specialty in
which various health care professionals are engaged. Many specialists,
such as surgeons and radiologists, are heavily dependent on access to
hospitals. Even those who are not dependent upon hospital facilities and
personnel benefit from the extension of hospital privileges.5 These spe-
cialists may wish to admit patients for testing, observation, or other diag-
nostic purposes. If privileges are denied, the specialist may be forced to
refer patients to physicians who already have privileges. Additionally,
specialists who do not have admitting privileges may be placed at a com-
petitive disadvantage because of the perception that they are not as
skilled as those professionals who have been granted privileges.6
At the same time that the medical profession routinely was becom-
ing the target of antitrust challenges, physicians were calling upon legis-
lators to reduce the cost of malpractice insurance and contain the rising
tide of malpractice litigation.7 In response, many state legislatures passed
laws requiring hospitals to engage in greater scrutiny of doctors who ap-
ply for staff privileges, and increased investigation and prosecution of
3. See infra notes 114-72 and accompanying text; see also Marrese v. Interqual, 748 F.2d 373
(7th Cir. 1984) cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985) (staff privileges of hospital surgeon revoked);
Pontius v. Children's Hospital, 552 F. Supp. 1352 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (staff privileges of hospital sur-
geon revoked); Quinn v. Kent General Hospital, 617 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Del. 1985) (refusal to admit
physician to hospital's active medical staff).
4. See infra notes 82-89 and accompanying text; see also Nurse-Midwifery Associates v. Hibbett,
549 F. Supp. 1185 (M.D. Tenn. 1982) (restraint of nurse-midwives' practice); Bhan v. NME Hosp.,
772 F.2d 1467 (9th Cir. 1985) (restraint of nurse-anesthetist's practice).
5. Dolan & Ralston, HospitalAdmitting Privileges and the Sherman Act, 18 Hous. L. REV. 707,
713 (1981).
6. Id. at 713-14.
7. See infra notes 90-113 and accompanying text.
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professional misconduct.' The danger of being charged with anticompeti-
tive conduct exists any time members of a particular profession collec-
tively decide whether a colleague-who is also a competitor of the
decisionmakers-may be part of that group, or whether he should be
excluded. 9 This is precisely the position in which peer review boards
across the country find themselves.
In recognition of this irony, doctors turned to an antitrust defense
known as the "state action" doctrine to insulate peer review boards act-
ing in compliance with state mandates from antitrust challenges.1" Pro-
tection was conferred erattically, however, and peer review boards
continued to perform their legislatively required functions under the
threat of antitrust liability." Many health-care providers were disap-
pointed with that the Supreme Court's decision in Patrick v. Burget.12
Although it only indicated that the particular state statute involved in
the case was insufficient to confer immunity on the defendant peer review
board, those involved in the peer review process had hoped for a more
absolute declaration on their behalf. The result is that many doctors still
fear that vigorous enforcement of statutory requirements to evaluate
their peers will tempt the filing of an antitrust suit against them.
Section II of this Comment provides an overview of the evolution of
the application of antitrust law to the professions, and to the health care
field in particular. Section III describes the rise to prominence of the peer
review process as an integral part of a legislative package to contain med-
ical malpractice litigation. It also discusses state action immunity from
antitrust litigation for peer review boards acting in compliance with state
mandates, and examines the implications of the Supreme Court's holding
in Patrick v. Burget. Section IV explores solutions which would allow
hospitals to freely engage in effective peer review while being insulated
from federal antitrust liability. Both state and federal legislators have
given a vote of confidence to peer review by drafting statutes compelling
its use. This Comment asserts that in order to make such review effective,
reliable protection must be afforded to the physicians conducting it.
8. See infra notes 90-113, 147-68 and accompanying text.
9. See Snow, Trust versus Antitrust, THE ATLANTIC, Sept. 1986, at 26.
10. See infra notes 146-72 and accompanying text.
11. For examples of different interpretations of the state action doctrine by different states, see
Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Center, 851 F.2d 1273 (1lth Cir. 1988); Marrese v. Interqual, 748
F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985); Quinn v. Kent General Hospital, 617 F.
Supp. 1226 (D. Del. 1985).
12. Taylor, Doctors Can Sue in Peer Review, Justices Declare, N.Y. Times, May 17, 1988, Sec-
tion 1, at 1, col. 5.
1988/891
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Without immunity from federal antitrust litigation, peer review will exist
in form only, and the goals it was supposed to achieve will remain
unfulfilled.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF ANTITRUST ACTIONS
AGAINST THE PROFESSIONS
Many of the antitrust suits against hospital peer review boards are
brought under section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits "every con-
tract, combination . . ., or conspiracy in restraint of trade or com-
merce." 13 The law was enacted by the federal government after the Civil
War to regulate trusts and monopolies which had begun to restrain inter-
state commerce. The intended targets of regulation were "trade" and
"commerce," terms which included activities such as the transportation
of goods and passengers, the purchase and sale of commodities, dealings
in intangibles, commercial services, and other business activities for
gain.14 Antitrust law was not initially intended to apply to the
professions.
The manner in which the term "trade or commerce" was originally
interpreted implicitly excluded the professions and many service indus-
tries. Even before passage of the Sherman Act, the distinction between a
trade and a profession had been formulated. In 1834, Justice Story stated
in The Schooner Nymph that, "[w]herever any occupation, employment,
or business is carried on for the purpose of profit, or gain, or a livelihood,
not in the liberal arts or in the learned professions, it is constantly called
a trade."15 Almost a century later, in FTC v. Raladam Co., the Supreme
Court stated that "medical professionals ... follow a profession and not
a trade."16
In addition to the difficulty of fitting the professions into traditional
notions of "trade or commerce," the Sherman Act also requires that the
activity at issue have an effect on interstate commerce. 7 This, too, con-
tributed to the idea that the professions were not meant to come under
the purview of commercial antitrust laws. For example, in Federal Base-
ball Club v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, the Supreme
113. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Such suits may also be brought under § 2, which states that "[e]very
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce" is guilty of a felony. 15 U.S.C.
§ 2 (1982).
14. J. VAN CISE, UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST LAWS 22 (1963).
15. 18 F. Cas. 506, 507 (C.C.D. Me. 1834) (No. 10,388).
16. 283 U.S. 643, 653 (1931).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
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Court stated that "a firm of lawyers sending out a member to argue a
case.., does not engage in... commerce because the lawyer.., goes to
another State.""8
Aside from the problems posed by the particular language of the
Sherman Act and the manner in which it was interpreted, a number of
factors distinguish a profession from a trade or other occupations, and
contribute to the difficulty of applying commercial laws to it. According
to one commentator, the core characteristics of a profession are "a pro-
longed specialized training in a body of abstract knowledge, and a collec-
tivity or service orientation."' 9 Other characteristics are derived from
this core and further emphasize the profession's autonomy. The profes-
sion determines its own standards of education and training; professional
practice is often legally recognized by some form of licensure, the proce-
dures of which are run by members of the profession; most legislation
affecting the profession is shaped by that profession, itself; and the practi-
tioner is relatively free of lay evaluation and control. 20
Not only is medicine imbued with these qualities, but its authority is
particularly persuasive because of the "therapeutic" definition of the phy-
sician's role. The power of the profession stems in large part from its
fundamental endeavor to preserve and promote health.2' The value of
this substantial undertaking to individuals and society, and the expertise
held by physicians allows them wide latitude in making decisions regard-
ing patient care and the role of allied health professionals in hospital
settings.
Accepting the autonomy of quality-assurance bodies such as peer
review boards was a natural extension of the popular perception that
doctors should be left alone to make their own decisions regarding pa-
tient care, free from interference of the lay public. While quality-assur-
ance activities exist in the commercial realm as well as in the professions,
the independence inherent in the concept of professional peer review dis-
tinguishes it from the manner in which it is conducted in industry.22 Ac-
cording to one pair of experts:
The autonomy accorded health professionals, in particular members of the
medical profession, represents a general societal recognition that to be car-
18. 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922).
19. Goode, Encroachment, Charlatanism, and the Emerging Profession: Psychology, Sociology,
and Medicine, 25 AM. Soc. REV. 902, 903 (1960).
20. Id.
21. P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 80 (1982).




ried out effectively, the work of health professionals must be conducted in
an environment of patient-provider confidentiality and mutual trust. The
autonomy of health professionals is not something won through the indus-
triousness and determination of individual professional groups. Rather, it
represents the willingness of society to grant that autonomy, if assured that
its interests will be protected by self-regulatory or peer review monitoring of
the professions' members. In other words, the expectation is that health
professionals will ultimately be accountable for their own actions. 2
3
Because of the especially revered and respected position occupied by
physicians in our society, the advent of the application of commercial
antitrust laws to health care providers must have come as a particularly
rude shock to those in the field. Such litigation meant that the medical
profession would have to answer to laypersons and others outside of their
professional enclave, and to incorporate commercial concerns into many
aspects of health care planning.24
One of the earliest applications of antitrust law to the medical pro-
fession came in 1943, when the Supreme Court upheld a conviction of
the American Medical Association (AMA) for violating the Sherman
Act by attempting to put out of business Group Health Association
(GHA), a nonprofit cooperative organized to provide medical care to
prepaying subscribers.25 Before even addressing the issue of their alleg-
edly anticompetitive activities, the American Medical Association argued
that the Sherman Act should not apply since neither the practice of
medicine nor the business of GHA could be considered "trade" as the
term is used in the Sherman Act.26
The Court dodged the task of confronting this issue directly. 27 In-
stead, it focused its analysis on the structure and function of GHA, itself.
It described the "corporate activity" of GHA as "the consummation of
the cooperative effort of its members to obtain for themselves and their
families medical service and hospitalization on a risk-sharing prepayment
basis."2 The Court found that the activities of the health cooperative
were within the "sphere of business," and "the calling or occupation of
the individual physicians charged as defendants is immaterial if the pur-
pose and effect of their conspiracy was such obstruction and restraint of
23. Id. at 114.
24. Jacobs, Examining Collusive Conduct in Health Care Markets: A Law Enforcement Perspec-
tive, 33 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 334 (1986).
25. American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
26. Id. at 527.




the business of Group Health."2 9 Although the Court's decision made it
clear that a pre-paid health plan like GHA could be considered a trade or
business entitled to protection from antitrust activity, it left unanswered
"the question whether a physician's practice of his profession constitutes
trade under.., the Sherman Act."3
The Court's decision implicitly recognized that doctors, like any
other provider of services or goods, are sensitive to prices charged by
their competitors. The opinion actually stated that:
In truth, the petitioners represented physicians who desired that they
and all others should practice independently on a fee for service basis where
whatever arrangement for payment each had was a matter that lay between
him and his patient in each individual case of service or treatment....
These independent physicians, and the two petitioning associations which
represent them [the American Medical Association and the Medical Society
of the District of Columbia] were interested solely in preventing the opera-
tion of a business conducted in corporate form by Group Health.3 '
However, the Court fell short of actually characterizing the medical pro-
fession as a "trade" within the meaning of the Sherman Act, even though
this passage indicates it was certainly aware of the commercial and eco-
nomic interests motivating the physicians' actions. This case opened the
door to the realm of professional antitrust liability, but an outright recog-
nition of the commercial aspects of medical practice was still taboo.
The Supreme Court explicitly included the learned professions as a
legitimate target of antitrust litigation more than thirty years later in
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.32 Petitioners attempted to find an attorney
to perform a title examination for them for less than the fee prescribed in
a minimum fee schedule published by the county bar association. 33 When
they failed, they sued the Virginia State Bar for enforcing behavior that
allegedly constituted price-fixing in violation of the Sherman Act.34
Goldfarb is significant for a number of reasons. First of all, it was
the most expansive reading to date of the Sherman Act's interstate com-
merce requirement.35 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals had held that
the legal services at issue were performed wholly intrastate and were es-
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 536.
32. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
33. Id. at 776.
34. Id. at 778.
35. M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE, R. PITOFSKY, & H. GOLDSCHMID, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TRADE REGULATION 158-59 (1983) [hereinafter M. HANDLER, TRADE REGULATION].
1988/89]
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sentially local in nature.36 The Supreme Court disagreed. Indicating that
a significant portion of the funds for purchasing homes in Fairfax
County, Virginia came from outside of the state, the Court concluded
that "the transactions which create the need for the particular legal serv-
ices in question frequently are interstate transactions. '3 7 The Court
found a link between interstate commerce and the minimum fee schedule
because the schedule affected a legal service-title examination-which
is an integral part of real estate transactions-an interstate commercial
activity. 8
Goldfarb also began to define the limits of the state action doctrine,
which will be discussed more fully in Section III, below. State action
immunity is generally available to individuals engaging in anticompeti-
tive activity pursuant to a state statute.3 9 The Court here made a distinc-
tion between general regulatory activities the state conducts with respect
to the legal profession, and direct supervision. It concluded that "it can-
not fairly be said that the State of Virginia through its Supreme Court
Rules required the anticompetitive activities of either respondent."40 The
case is also significant both for its expansion of the Sherman Act to ex-
plicitly include the professions, and for the restriction the Court placed
on that expansion in the very same opinion. In what now has become a
famous footnote, the Supreme Court recognized that professions ought to
be treated differently than "other business activities."', The Justices ad-
mitted that "[t]he public service aspect, and other features of the profes-
sions, may require that a particular practice, which could properly be
viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated
differently."'42 The Court neglected to provide any concrete guidance re-
garding how to weigh self-regulation by a profession, as opposed to such
regulation by a business. Subsequent decisions at times seem to belie the
fact that a reservation for the professions exists at all.43 In the words of
one commentator:
There is the inevitable difficulty of determining where the line is to be
drawn. If professional groups cannot regulate maximum or minimum
prices, cannot forbid advertising, encroachment, or solicitation, and if, con-
36. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Ass'n, 421 U.S. at 783.
37. Id. at 783-84.
38. Id.
39. See infra notes 146-72 and accompanying text.
40. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Ass'n, 421 U.S. at 790.
41. Id. at 788 n.17.
42. Id.
43. See infra notes 45-88 and accompanying text.
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ceivably, even disciplinary action authorizing expulsion for unethical be-
havior maypartake of a group boycott, what remains of the Goldfarb
reservation?'
Very little of the reservation remained in 1978 when the Supreme
Court considered an antitrust challenge to the regulatory activities of a
profession in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States.'
The Society, which consisted of approximately 69,000 members, was or-
ganized to regulate the nontechnical aspects of engineering practice.4
The Society's Code of Ethics prohibited the disclosure of prices to poten-
tial customers until after negotiations had resulted in the initial selection
of an engineer, ostensibly for fear that allowance of such bidding would
lead to deceptively low bids, and would thereby tempt individual engi-
neers to do inferior work which might cause a public safety hazard.'
The United States challenged the Code on the grounds that it suppressed
price competition and deprived customers of the benefits of free and open
competition.48
The Court found that the Society's asserted defense, itself, con-
firmed the existence of a prima facie violation of the Sherman Act: the
Society's justification for nondisclosure of prices "rests on the assump-
tion that the agreement will tend to maintain the price level,",49 and any
action that has a direct price effect usually is considered a per se violation
of the Sherman Act.5 0 While condemning the restriction as a per se viola-
tion, it clarified the rule of reason standard, stating that "[c]ontrary to its
name, the Rule does not open the field of antitrust inquiry to any argu-
ment in favor of a challenged restraint that may fall within the realm of
reason. Instead, it focuses directly on the challenged restraint's impact on
44. Handler, Antitrust-1978, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1363, 1366 (1978).
45. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
46. Id. at 682.
47. Id. at 684-85.
48. Id. at 684.
49. Id. at 693.
50. There are two basic approaches to examining acts accused of being anticompetitive: the
"rule of reason" analysis and the "per se" analysis. The rule of reason, formulated in Standard Oil
Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), asks whether the challenged activity is unreasonably
restrictive of competitive conditions. As a part of this inquiry, the anticompetitive and procompeti-
tive effects of the activity may be examined. The per se rule was developed in Northern Pac. Ry. Co.
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). According to that decision, certain acts or practices have such a
pernicious effect on competition that they are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable, and no
elaborate inquiry into the precise harm they have caused is necessary. Any agreements among com-
petitors relating to price maintenance are usually condemned per se. Defendants in National Society
attempted to utilize a rule of reason analysis, arguing that the restraint on price competition ulti-




Justice Stevens directly confronted the seeming contradiction with
the Goldfarb "learned profession" defense that had given professionals a
glimmer of hope. According to Stevens, he and his fellow Justices:
adhere to the view expressed in Goldfarb that, by their nature, professional
services may differ significantly from other business services, and, accord-
ingly, the nature of the competition in such services may vary. Ethical
norms may serve to regulate and promote this competition, and thus fall
within the Rule of Reason. But the Society's argument in this case is a far
cry from such a position.5
2
Thus, the Court ruled that nondisclosure of prices could not be jus-
tified on the grounds of protecting public safety, at least within the engi-
neering profession. It said nothing about whether other professions
would be held to the same finding, and did little to clear up the murki-
ness left by Goldfarb's vague and noncommittal language regarding the
different standards which should apply to a profession. The Court re-
duced the issue to one of competition: if the regulation cannot be said to
promote competition, even if there are other justifications for it, then it
will not pass the rule of reason test.5 3 This statement is ambiguous for it
ultimately rests on a definition of "competition" which the Court failed
to provide. By the time this case was decided, the term had come to
encompass a variety of different activities. 4 The Court's formulation
seems to favor a simplistic model of competition in which prices are re-
duced and output increased. 5 Under this approach, actions which di-
rectly affect price must either be shown to reduce price or increase output
in order to qualify for rule of reason analysis, rather than suffer auto-
51. National Soc. of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. at 688.
52. Id. at 696 (citations omitted).
53. See Handler, supra note 44, at 1366-69.
54. H. HOVEMKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 129 (1985). One of the
great debates in the field of antitrust law focuses on defining what, exactly, the Sherman Act is
intended to achieve. The basic premise of the law is to preserve and promote "competition." Under-
lying this is the assumption that competition is desirable because it will keep prices of competing
goods and services low, and their quality high.
The question of how the Sherman Act is meant to operate must necessarily turn to a definition of
what is meant by "competition." A traditional model envisions many small businesses vying for
customers, and doing whatever is necessary to make a better, cheaper product in order to attract
them. However, what if a situation exists in which the best and cheapest product is manufactured by
a company with extraordinary market power? Should the company be disbanded because it has
concentrated market power, even if this would mean that consumers will be forced to buy more
expensive products of lower quality? This decision is just one example of the complexity inherent in
the word "competition" and in the application of the Sherman Act, itself. For an overview of the
history and goals of antitrust policy, see M. HANDLER, TRADE REGULATION 1-20.
55. H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 54, at 129.
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matic condemnation under the per se rule.56
The breadth of the antitrust-net continued to expand in Arizona v.
Maricopa County Medical Society.57 Respondent medical foundations, by
agreement of their member doctors, established maximum fees doctors
could claim in full payment for health services provided to policyholders
of specified insurance plans. Participating doctors agreed not to charge
more than a certain price for services, and participating insurance com-
panies agreed to pay the full costs of the services provided. The ar-
rangement was designed to offer a substantial savings to patients, who
otherwise would have had to make a copayment with the insurance com-
pany for the treatment rendered.59
Because the agreement had a direct effect on price, the court applied
the per se rule.6° However, there were a number of factors which distin-
guished Maricopa from more typical price-fixing cases, and which sup-
ported arguments in favor of a rule of reason analysis. The most obvious
of these was the fact that the arrangement did, indeed, reduce medical
costs. 61 The facts suggested that doctors who did not participate in the
plan were charging rates that were the same as or higher than those
charged by participating doctors-strong evidence that the plan was ac-
tually reducing health care costs.62 Moreover, the arrangement was
nonexclusive: participating physicians could come and go as they
pleased, and they were free to treat any patients they wished, including
those who did not subscribe to insurance policies partaking of the ar-
rangement.63 If this were a true cartel, no such independent activity
would be permitted.6
In addition to these factors, the nature of the insurance industry
56. Id.
57. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
58. Id. at 341.
59. Id. at 342.
60. Id. at 354. The Court justified use of the per se rule by arguing that maximum price-fixing
could be used as a disguise for minimum price-fixing. Id. at 348.
61. See HOVEMKAMP, supra note 54, at 133.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. Id. at 133-34. A cartel is "an agreement among perfect competitors to sell all their output at
the same, agreed upon price. By entering such an agreement the firms acting in concert can reduce
output and earn monopoly profits just as a single-firm monopolist." H. HOVEMKAMP, supra note 54,
at 83. A cartel will only be successful if all of its members play by the agreed-upon rules. There is
tremendous temptation to cheat, as the interests of individual cartel members may differ substan-
tially from one another. Nonetheless, "[i]f enough cartel members cheat . . . the cartel will fall
apart." Id. Thus, the independence accorded physicians participating in the arrangement in Mari-
copa is wholly inconsistent with the behavior necessary to maintain a cartel.
1988/89]
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undercut the Court's condemnation of the maximum price-fixing agree-
ment as a disguise for a minimum price-fixing agreement.65 If the ar-
rangement actually were an illegal minimum price-fixing agreement, then
it would make no economic sense for insurance companies to participate
in the plan since insurers want to avoid price increases that increase their
insured risk.66 Although the doctors stand in a horizontal relationship to
each other, and the Court declared horizontal price fixing agreements per
se illegal, the insurance companies stand in a vertical relationship with
the doctors. The vertical relationship is inconsistent with a minimum
price-fixing agreement among the doctors because the insurance compa-
nies earn more money when doctors charge less. Thus, not only the
nature of the medical profession, itself, but the manner in which third-
party payors factor into the equation, make appropriate application of
the antitrust laws in this arena difficult. At the very least, the Court's
analysis would have been more accurate and thorough had they used the
rule of reason test, rather than condemning the arrangement per se.
The problem of how best to deal with the role of insurance compa-
nies in the scheme of health care delivery arose once again in 1986 in
Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists.68 The Fed-
eration forbade members to submit x-rays to dental insurers in connec-
tion with insurance claims forms. The insurance companies insisted that
they needed access to these records in order to ensure that benefits would
be paid only for the "least expensive yet adequate treatment. '69 Dentists
feared that the practice might lead to a reduction of costs at the expense
of the proper treatment, so they withheld the x-rays from evaluation by
individuals who worked for the insurance companies.70
In 1978, the Federal Trade Commission issued a complaint against
the Federation, alleging the practice to be an unfair method of competi-
tion and a violation of the Sherman Act.7" After a full evidentiary hear-
ing before an administrative law judge, the Commission ordered the
Federation to cease and desist from further efforts to keep their member
dentists from submitting x-rays to insurers.72 Upon judicial review, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated the order
65. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc., 457 U.S. at 348.
66. See H. HOVEMKAMP, supra note 54, at 133.
67. Id.
68. 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
69. Id. at 449.
70. Id. at 449-50.
71. Id. at 451.
72. Id.
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on the ground that it was not supported by substantial evidence.73
Among other findings, the court held that there was no evidence that
dentists would compete for patients by offering cooperation with the in-
surance companies in the absence of a restraint.7' Further, the Commis-
sion failed to establish that the Federation had the power to effect the
alleged restraint of competition.75 Finally, the court criticized the Com-
mission for failing to find that the alleged restraint had actually resulted
in higher dental costs to patients and insurers.7 6 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether applicable antitrust principles
had been applied correctly, and whether the Court of Appeals had mis-
applied the substantial evidence test.
The Court first found that the evidence was sufficient to support the
Commission's findings.77 It then turned to the question of whether the
Federation's collective refusal to cooperate with insurers' requests for x-
rays constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the
Sherman Act. It noted similarities between the Federation's activities
and group boycotts, which are usually condemned per se. The Court then
made a perfunctory concession to Goldfarb by stating that "we have been
slow to condemn rules adopted by professional associations as unreason-
able per se."T However, it still condemned the arrangement using a rule
of reason analysis.
In so doing, the Court sidestepped direct consideration of noncom-
petitive "quality of care" justifications for the Federation's activities, ac-
knowledging that the FTC had considered them and had found that no
such justification had been established.79 It viewed as unwarranted the
implication that "an unrestrained market in which consumers are given
access to the information they believe to be relevant to their choices will
lead them to make unwise and even dangerous choices." 8 Once again,
while insisting that it believed that the special problems of the health care
field somehow merit different treatment where antitrust law is concerned,
the Court's decision indicated that it was inappropriate to apply that phi-
losophy, at least in this particular case. While the Court acknowledged
73. Id. at 453. The Seventh Circuit seems to have been particularly amendable to the "quality of
care" defense, at least in the early 1980s. See infra notes 82-88.
74. 476 U.S. at 453.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 455-57.
78. Id. at 458.
79. Id. at 464.
80. Id. at 463.
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the existence of the "quality of care" defense, it continued to politely
ignore it.81
The elements of another "quality of care" defense were articulated
recently by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In Wilk v. American
Medical Association, a group of chiropractors sued a number of medical
organizations, alleging that these groups had attempted to. eliminate the
chiropractic profession through the promulgation of certain anticompeti-
tive principles which were expected to be adhered to by organizational
members.8 2
At trial, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants.8 3 On appeal,
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case and clearly de-
lineated each party's burden of proof, outlining specific elements of what
was dubbed the "patient care defense." If the plaintiffs met their burden
of showing that the effect of the defendants' actions had been to restrict
competition, the defendants could then come forward with the patient
care defense, which requires the establishment of four elements. The de-
fendants must show: (1) that they genuinely entertained a concern for
what they perceive as scientific method in the care of each person with
whom they had entered into a doctor-patient relationship; (2) that this
concern was objectively reasonable; (3) that this concern was the domi-
nant motivating factor in engaging in anticompetitive activity; and (4)
that this concern for scientific method in patient care could not have
been adequately satisfied in a manner less restrictive of competition.8 4
On remand, the court found that defendants had failed to satisfy all
the elements of the patient care defense. The AMA did not convince the
district court that its concern for the scientific method was objectively
reasonable throughout the duration of the boycott.8 5 However, the judge
was careful to stop short of validating chiropractic as a health-care sci-
ence, stating that "[t]his finding.., should not be construed as a judicial
endorsement of chiropractic."8 6 The court also determined that the
AMA could have satisfied its concern for the use of scientific method in
patient care through means less restrictive than a nationwide boycott of
81. See Palmer, High Court Hands Professionals Antitrust Setback, LEGAL TiMEs, July 7, 1986,
at 22.
82. 719 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1983), revdon remand, 671 F. Supp. 1465 (N.D. I11. 1987) modifying
Docket No. 76 C 3777 (N.D. Ill., Aug. 27, 1987) (Memorandum and Order of District Judge Susan
Getzendanner) [hereinafter Memorandum and Order].
83. Memorandum and Order at 3.
84. Id. at 4-5.




the chiropractic profession. 7 The judge issued an injunction ordering the
AMA to modify its policy to indicate it is ethical for a doctor to associate
with a chiropractor "[provided] the physician believes [the association] is
in [the] best interests of the patient.""8
The decision is unusual in that economic gain was not found to be
the predominant motive behind the allegedly anticompetitive behavior;
rather, concern for patient care was the primary impetus. In any event,
the AMA had changed its policy in 1980 to indicate that it was not un-
ethical for physicians to associate with chiropractors, so the decision
would have little, if any, practical effect on physicians or their patients.8 9
Although the defendants did not prevail, Wilk seems to be the farthest
any court has come with regard to evaluating allegedly anticonipetitive
activities in light of quality-of-care justifications.
III. THE RISE OF PEER REVIEW AND THE NEED FOR IMMUNITY
A. Attempts to Curb Medical Malpractice Litigation in New York
During the same period in which the application of antitrust laws to
the learned professions evolved, physicians were becoming embroiled in a
medical malpractice and insurance litigation crisis.90 In the 1970s, insur-
ance companies began pulling out of the medical malpractice market be-
cause of the sharp increase in the number of such suits brought, and the
exorbitant damage awards and settlements offered. 9 A number of factors
contributed to the proliferation of such suits, including unrealistic patient
expectations regarding their treatment; an increase in the number of indi-
viduals obtaining medical treatment due to the availability of public and
private insurance; deterioration of the traditional, personal and long-last-
ing physician-patient relationship resulting from specialization by doc-
tors and fragmentation of patient care; increased awareness of
consumers' rights; and use of experimental technology with an attendant
increase in exposure to unknown risks.9 2 Physicians began to call upon
87. Id. at 36.
88. 671 F. Supp. at 1507.
89. Judge Bars AMA From Impeding Chiropractic Profession, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1987, Sec. 1,
at 49, col. 1.
90. See Note, New York's Medical Malpractice Insurance Crises--A New Direction for Reform,
14 FORDHAM L.J. 773 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Insurance Crises]. For an overview of the medical
malpractice problem in New York State, see Note, The 1985 Medical Malpractice Reform Act: The
New York State Legislature Responds to the Medical Malpractice Crisis with a Prescription for Com-
prehensive Reform, 52 BROOKLYN L. REV. 135, 135-44 (1986) [hereinafter, Note, Reform Act].
91. Note, Insurance Crises, supra note 90, at 773.
92. Note, Reform Act, supra note 90, at 138.
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state legislatures to take action to contain the spiral of insurance premi-
ums and malpractice suits being brought against them. 93
In New York, early attempts to deal with the problem focused on
the suits, themselves. In 1974, the state legislature created pre-trial
screening and mediation panels to evaluate medical malpractice claims
and attempt to resolve them before resorting to a full-blown trial.94 The
panels proved ineffective since their rulings were nonbinding and panel-
ists only served on a voluntary basis.95
The following year, the focus shifted to ensuring that malpractice
insurance would be available to physicians despite the exodus of private
carriers from the market.96 New York's primary medical malpractice in-
surer, Employer's Insurance of Wausau, had withdrawn just the previous
year.97 The legislature created a joint underwriting association to act as a
temporary malpractice insurer, and mandated detailed reporting of
claims to state officials.9s It also made admissible as evidence at malprac-
tice trials the opinion of a medical malpractice panel if at least three
panel members agreed on the question of liability.99 Additionally, the law
created a State Board for Professional Medical Conduct with the Depart-
ment of Health."°
The law was ill-received by medical professionals.' 0 While some
doctors criticized it for not going far enough to reduce insurance premi-
ums, others faulted its failure to address what was arguably at the root of
the entire insurance and litigation dilemma: patient injuries caused by
substandard medical care. One commentator summed up this sentiment
as follows:
[E]ven a casual survey of the rash of malpractice reforms enacted to date
shows the inordinate attention devoted to insurance and legal system con-
comitants compared to recommended improvements in health system qual-
ity controls, injury prevention, and the like. It is as though the legislatures,
in their headlong rush to "get something on the books," ignored the indis-
putable precipitating cause of the entire problem-medical injury-prefer-
ring instead to deal with better-understood and more manageable issues....
[O]ur greatest need is to re-think the malpractice problem from a broader
93. T. LOMBARDI, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: A LEGISLATOR'S VIEW xv (1978).
94. Id. at 85.
95. Id.
96. Note, Reform Act, supra note 90, at 139-140.
97. 30 Rec. A.B. City ofN. Y 336 (1979) [hereinafter Committee Reports].
98. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 6148-a (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1989).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. T. LOMBARDI, supra note 93, at 46.
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vantage point. If malpractice claims are attributable primarily to maloccur-
rences in the treatment process, should we not be devoting more attention
to the development of health system quality controls that will reduce their
frequency? Is it possible to build into the present (fault-based) malpractice
system a better assortment of rewards and sanctions so that substandard
practices are prevented more effectively.. .?1o2
Thus, rather than emphasizing policies which attempted to minimize
damage to a doctor once a malpractice suit has been brought, some ex-
perts preferred to channel efforts toward preventing malpractice in the
first place.
This approach was recommended in a report published by a com-
mittee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, which
studied the medical malpractice insurance crisis in 1975.103 The commit-
tee found that "the Board of Regents has not exercised sufficiently its
statutory authority to police the profession,"" ° and recommended that
the New York State Medical Society be authorized "to participate more
actively in the disciplinary process."' 05 The committee also suggested
that hospitals be required to notify the Board of Regents of the suspen-
sion, revocation, or curtailment of any physician's hospital privileges,"0 6
and that health care institutions establish "medical injury prevention
programs" to study common injuries and develop means of minimizing
their risks. 1 7 The report concluded with a general recommendation that
"[g]reater emphasis on prevention of medical injuries" be adopted.'08
These criticisms and recommendations were incorporated into New
York's second attempt to confront the medical malpractice crisis in 1985.
The state's new Medical Malpractice Reform Act, in addition to attempt-
ing to contain both malpractice awards and the number of cases tried,
goes much farther than its predecessor in imposing requirements
designed to actually reduce the incidence of malpractice. 09 The legisla-
ture found that hospitals should establish medical and dental malpractice
prevention programs, as well as increase scrutiny of doctors and dentists
prior to granting privileges.1 '0 Once privileges have been granted, hospi-
102. Bernzweig, Foreword to T. LOMBARDI, supra note 93, at xi-xii.
103. Committee Reports, supra note 97, at 336.
104. Id. at 358.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 359.
108. Id. at 360.
109. Medical Malpractice Reform Act 1985 N.Y. Laws Ch. 294 (hereinafter Reform Act). See
Note, Insurance Crises, supra note 90, at 787.
110. Reform Act, ch. 294, § 1.
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tals should allocate increased resources to the investigation and prosecu-
tion of professional misconduct."'
The Reform Act also mandates that every hospital maintain a pro-
gram to identify medical malpractice. 12 Each such program must consist
of, among other things, a quality assurance committee which periodically
reviews credentials and competence as part of an evaluation of staff privi-
leges. The committee is authorized to implement sanction procedures to
aid in enforcement of its decisions. Prior to renewing or granting profes-
sional privileges or association, the hospital must obtain information
from the doctor regarding the individual's prior professional affiliations,
and any professional misconduct or malpractice proceedings against him
or her. Additionally, anyone who, in good faith, provides information to
further the malpractice prevention program or participates on the quality
assurance committee cannot be subject to an action for civil damages or
other relief as a result of such activity.' 13
B. Patrick v. Burget" 4
At the same time, on the other side of the country, peer review was
receiving quite different treatment. In the early 1980s in the small Ore-
gon town of Astoria, a physician was in the process of suing a sizable
portion of the town's doctors on antitrust grounds for terminating his
hospital privileges. The physician, Timothy Patrick, won his jury trial
and was awarded $650,000' for the antitrust violations, which the court
trebled as provided by the Sherman Act.' 1 6 He also was awarded $20,000
in compensatory damages, $90,000 in punitive damages, and $228,600 in
attorney's fees, " 7 for a total award of nearly $2.3 million. By the time the
litigation ran the full course of its appeals during the next eight years, the
jury's verdict would be reversed by a Court of Appeals, and reinstated by
the Supreme Court.
1. The Facts and Circumstances of Patrick v. Burget. Patrick v.
Burget is practically a case study in how not to conduct peer review. In
1972, Dr. Patrick came to Astoria to practice medicine. The medical
needs of the town's 9,500 residents were served primarily by Columbia
111. Id.
112. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-j(I) (McKinney Supp. 1989).
113. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-j(2) (McKinney Supp. 1989).
114. 800 F.2d 1498 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd 108 S. Ct. 1658, (1988).
115. 800 F.2d at 1504-05.




Memorial Hospital' II and the Astoria Clinic, 119 a partnership of eleven
physicians. The Clinic needed a surgeon and hired Dr. Patrick under a
one-year employment contract. After the contract had expired, he was
invited to become a partner, but he refused and established his own prac-
tice in general and vascular surgery which competed directly with the
clinic. 120
According to Dr. Patrick, the doctors at the Astoria Clinic resented
him for starting a competing practice. He claimed that they refused to
refer patients to him, and even sent some emergency cases fifty miles
away in order to avoid giving Patrick a referral.121 Patrick also com-
plained that Clinic physicians refused to provide cross-coverage for his
patients when he was out-of-town.1 22 Nonetheless, Dr. Patrick's practice
did well, and he continued to perform surgery at Columbia Memorial
Hospital. 123
In the fall of 1979, a patient named Leroy Willie was operated on by
Dr. Patrick. After the surgery, Patrick had to leave town for a medical
meeting, and asked his recently-hired associate, Dr. Weber, to care for
the patient in his absence.124 Dr. Weber, himself, had to leave for a medi-
cal meeting the next day, so the doctors arranged for an independent
family practitioner to cross-cover for both of them during the estimated
six hours that both Patrick and Weber would be out-of-town simultane-
ously. 125 The patient's conditioned worsened during this interval, and he
died while being transported to another hospital. 126
On November 15, 1979, the Executive Committee of Columbia Me-
morial Hospital referred an investigation of Dr. Patrick's handling of this
case to the Board of Medical Examiners (BOME), which has complete
regulatory authority over the practice of medicine in Oregon.1 27 The in-
vestigative committee of the BOME was chaired by Dr. Russell, one of
118. The hospital has sixty-five beds and between twenty and twenty-five doctors on staff. Peti-
tioner's Brief at 3, Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498 (9th Cir. 1986) (No. 86-1145), rev'd, 108 S. Ct.
1658 (1988) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief].
119. Most doctors in Astoria belonged to the Astoria Clinic. Astoria Clinic physicians consist-
ently constituted about a two-thirds majority of the Columbia Memorial Hospital Executive Com-
mittee. Id. at 3-4.
120. Id. at 5.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 10.
123. Id. at 6.
124. Id. at 16.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 16-17.
127. Respondent's Brief at 4, Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498 (9th Cir. 1986) (No. 86-1145),
rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief].
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the members of the Astoria Clinic.128 The Board issued a letter of repri-
mand and constructive criticism to Dr. Patrick,'29 and at the same time
sent a letter to the hospital criticizing it for, among other things, lax
grant of surgical privileges.130 Dr. Patrick admitted that the Board's crit-
icism of his handling of the Willie case was fair, but questioned the
BOME's actions in reviewing charts of his other patients since he had not
been given an opportunity to review and discuss these.' 3 ' After subse-
quently reviewing these charts, the Board declined to modify Its repri-
mand letter. 132 Dr. Patrick then filed a Petition for judicial review of the
determination along with a civil claim for damages against the BOME. 133
In December of 1981, the Board withdrew its reprimand letter. 34
One month earlier, however, Dr. Patrick performed an operation
which would incite yet another round of investigative activity directed
against him. Dr. Patrick removed the appendix of a 15-year-old boy, Stu-
art Snodgrass, on the basis of the diagnosis of a Coast Guard physician
who had referred the patient. 135 The patient did not recover, so Dr. Pat-
rick operated a second time to check for infection. 36 The boy still failed
to recover, and a hospital urologist later diagnosed the boy as having
testicular cancer.137
The Executive Committee of Columbia Memorial Hospital formed
an investigative committee which reviewed Dr. Patrick's practice. They
granted Dr. Patrick a hearing, after which they decided that his privi-
leges should be terminated. 138
Pursuant to the Hospital's bylaws, Dr. Patrick requested a hearing
regarding the decision.' 39 During the seventeen sessions and sixty hours
of testimony which comprised the hearing, 40 one expert testified that the
Snodgrass case involved a "major misdiagnosis" which there was "no
128. Petitioner's Brief at 17-18.
129. Respondent's Brief at 8.
130. Id. at 9.
131. Id. at 9-10.
132. Id. at 13.
133. Id.
134. Id.




138. Respondent's Brief at 15. Patrick is reported to have said that his only mistake in the
Snodgrass case was "being caught." Id. at n.2.
139. Id. at 15.
140. Id. at 16.
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way to defend."' 41 Another expert concluded that, given the errors Dr.
Patrick had committed, the Hospital was obligated "to put him on pro-
bation and compel him to participate in consultation on elective surgery
and in post-consultations on emergency cases."' 4 2 The expert testified
that the Snodgrass episode, alone, warranted probation. 43 After the
hearing, Dr. Patrick terminated the review process before taking the in-
ternal appeals provided by the hospital's bylaws," and brought suit in
federal court on antitrust grounds against members of the Astoria Clinic.
The jury found for Dr. Patrick and awarded him nearly $2.3 million. 4
2. The Appeals. On appeal, the defendants' primary argument fo-
cused on the fact that the state of Oregon requires medical peer review
activities by statute; as such, they asserted, peer review falls within the
purview of the state action exemption from antitrust challenges. 46
Oregon requires that its health care facilities be licensed.14 7 To
maintain that license, these facilities must have procedures for granting
or restricting privileges of the medical staff, and for staff review of each
other's practices in order to reduce morbidity and mortality and to im-
prove patient care.' 48 Any licensed health care facility that fails to con-
141. Id. at 17.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 18.
144. Id. at 19.
145. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
146. The state action doctrine was established in 1943 by the Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341 (1943). Parker involved a suit by raisin growers to prevent enforcement of a raisin
marketing program adopted under California law. The marketing program restricted competition
among growers and maintained prices in the distribution of their commodities to packers. The Court
held that the Sherman Act never was intended to restrain action by state officers or legislatures. Id.
at 350-51. According to the Court, "[i]n a dual system of government in which, under the Constitu-
tion, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their author-
ity, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be
attributed to Congress." Id. at 351. Although a state may not immunize violators of the Sherman
Act by explicitly authorizing them to violate it, actions taken pursuant to state regulations could be
immune from antitrust liability. Id.
More recently, the Supreme Court specified the elements of a two-pronged test to determine
whether private party defendants could assert state action immunity: the conduct must be "clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy" and "actively supervised by the State itself."
California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Mideal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980). Midcal in-
volved a state statute which regulated the sale prices of wine suppliers. The Court declared the
statute invalid because the power it gave to private parties to set prices was not supervised by the
state. Although the restrictions here were similar to those imposed by the state of California in
Parker, the latter case was distinguishable because the restraints in Parker were subject to direct
state supervision. Id.
147. OR. REV. STAT. § 441.015(1) (1987).
148. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 441.030, 441.055(3) (c)-(d).
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duct peer review as mandated, or that conducts peer review improperly is
in violation of Oregon's health laws.'49
Dr. Patrick's argument focused on the manner in which the pro-
ceedings were conducted. The Court of Appeals agreed that there was
substantial evidence that the "defendants acted in bad faith in the hospi-
tal's peer review process and in the BOME proceedings."' 5 Patrick was
convinced that he could not obtain a fair hearing from either the hospital
investigatory committee or the BOME, since partners in the Astoria
Clinic were members of both. 5 ' To bolster this claim, Patrick pointed
out that other doctors who had engaged in unprofessional conduct were
treated much more leniently, or were not disciplined at all. For example,
an orthopedic surgeon at Columbia Memorial Hospital, reportedly suf-
fered a nervous breakdown while performing a simple operation.'" 2 The
incident was never reported to the BOME.153 This physician also admit-
ted to being drunk while working in the emergency room. 54 Neither his
alcoholism, nor any specific incidents were the subject of any disciplinary
proceeding within the hospital, nor were they reported to the BOME, s
Dr. Patrick argued that the Oregon statute immunizes only good faith
peer review activity, and that the state action doctrine does not immunize
bad faith conduct.' 56
The Court of Appeals found that Patrick's interpretation miscon-
strued the nature of the doctrine. According to the Court, "[o]nce we
have determined that a state has acted to replace competition with regu-
lation in a given market, out of respect for the sovereignty of the state,
federal antitrust laws simply are displaced. The subjective motivations of
the individual actors are irrelevant."'' 57 Moreover, "[tihe fact that Ore-
gon only immunizes good faith conduct demonstrates that Patrick had a
state law remedy for any actions taken against him in bad faith," but the
fact remains that the challenged actions are those of the state.'15  The
Court thus reversed the judgment on the antitrust claims.
149. Respondent's Brief at 41. Thus, Dr. Patrick could have filed a complaint with the State
Health Division regarding the propriety of the peer review proceedings at Columbia Memorial
Hospital.
150. 800 F.2d at 1507.
151. Id. at 1504.
152. Petitioner's Brief at 13-14.
153. Id. at 14.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. 800 F.2d at 1507.




The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision on ap-
peal. 159 The Court framed the issue as "whether the state-action doctrine
of Parker v. Brown protects physicians in the State of Oregon from fed-
eral antitrust liability for their activities on hospital peer-review commit-
tees."160 It did not consider the significance of the evidence indicating
that the peer review activity in this case was conducted in bad faith. In-
stead, the Court zeroed in on a rigorous two-pronged test to determine
whether the anticompetitive conduct of private parties is state action and
thus exempt from antitrust scrutiny. 16
1
Two conditions must be met in order to pass the test. First, "the
challenged restraint must be 'one clearly articulated and affirmatively ex-
pressed as state policy.' ,162 Second, "the anticompetitive conduct 'must
be actively supervised by the State itself.' "163
The Court did not reach the "clear articulation" prong of the Mid-
cal test because it found that the "active supervision" requirement was
not satisfied." 4 The Court asserted that a state is not considered to ac-
tively supervise the termination of hospital privileges "unless a state offi-
cial has and exercises ultimate authority over private privilege
determinations."1 65 Oregon did not bestow this power upon its State
Health Division. Because the Division was not authorized "to review pri-
vate peer review decisions and overturn a decision that fails to accord
with state policy,"' 166 the activities of the Health Division do not qualify
as state action. Nor does the Oregon BOME actively supervise private
peer review decisions. Although the Board must be notified of a hospi-
tal's decision to terminate or restrict privileges, it does not have the
power to disapprove private privilege decisions.1
67
The respondents' last claim that state supervision exists via the state
judiciary system was also rejected. The Court refused to confront the
question directly, saying that "[tihis case ... does not require us to de-
cide the broad question whether judicial review of private conduct ever
159. 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988).
160. Id. at 1160(citations omitted).
161. Id. The test was formulated in California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Mideal Alumi-
num, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980). See supra note 146.
162. 108 S. Ct. at 1163 (quoting California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Mideal Aluminum,
Inc., 445 U.S. at 105).
163. Id. at 1163 (quoting California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Mideal Aluminum, Inc., 445
U.S. at 105).
164. Id. at 1163.





can constitute active supervision, because judicial review of privilege-ter-
mination decisions in Oregon, if such review exists at all, falls far short of
satisfying the active supervision requirement."' 168
Although the decision was anxiously awaited by the health care and
legal communities, 169 the opinion was disappointing from several per-
spectives. Advocates of peer review perceived the holding as a severe
blow to the peer review system. 170 Although the Court only interpreted
one state's laws, many fear that the decision will make peer review panel-
ists think twice before attempting to discipline an incompetent colleague
for fear of the potentially devastating antitrust consequences. 17 1 The
Court at least recognized that there are valid policy arguments for taking
steps to protect the peer review process, although it declined to take
those steps, itself; such arguments "essentially [challenge] the wisdom of
applying the antitrust laws to the sphere of medical care, and as such
[are] properly directed to the legislative branch."' 72
C. Congressional Encouragement of Peer Review
In 1986, partly as a response to the Patrick litigation, which was en
route to the Supreme Court, Congress recognized the need to facilitate
the work of peer review boards. To further this end, it passed the Health
Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA), the purpose of which was "to
improve the quality of medical care by encouraging physicians to identify
and discipline other physicians who are incompetent or who engage in
unprofessional behavior."'' 73 Unlike New York's medical malpractice re-
form legislation, which used peer review as a means of reducing the inci-
dence of medical malpractice, the federal bill was not intended to be a
direct solution to the medical malpractice crisis. 174 Rather, it was
168. Id. at 1165. For an example of a decision holding that the state judiciary can be considered
an appropriate supervisory authority for the purposes of the state action doctrine, see Bolt v. Halifax
Hosp. Medical Center, 851 F.2d 1273, 1282 (11th Cir. 1988).
169. See, eg., Snow, supra note 9, at 26; Rifler, Antitrust Law and Peer Review Remain at Odds,
HosPITALs, Feb. 5, 1986, at 58.
170. See N.Y. Times, May 17, 1988, § A, at 1, col. 5. Kirk B. Johnson, general counsel of the
American Medical Association, was disappointed that the Court allowed "the atom bomb of the
antitrust laws" to be used against peer review panels. Johnson admitted that the AMA "did not
defend the way peer review was done in this particular case," but was concerned that "the threat of
giant Federal lawsuits" will have a "chilling effect" on efforts to discipline incompetent doctors, Id.,
May 17, 1988 & § D, at 24, col. 6.
171. Id.
172. 108 S. Ct. at 1165 (1988).





designed "to deal with one important aspect of the medical malpractice
problem in this country-incompetent and unprofessional physi-
cians." '175 The primary objective of the HCQIA is to ensure that physi-
cians who have already been identified as incompetent or unprofessional
will not be able to move to a locale where their reputation is unknown,
and continue to practice bad medicine.
In order to accomplish the dual goals of identifying incompetent
doctors and then keeping them away from patients, the bill provides
guidelines for conducting peer review, including due process safeguards
for subjects of review;176 immunity for individuals engaging in peer re-
view activity in the "reasonable belief" that such activity is in further-
ance of quality health care;177 and a central clearinghouse to which all
actions taken against physicians will be reported so that such doctors will
not be able to hide from a past record of poor performance. 178 All states
have the option of adopting the HCQIA, or drafting their own legislation
providing peer review immunity and opting out of the federal statute by
October 14, 1989.179
The guidelines for professional review actions are grounded in a
"reasonable belief" standard. The drafters considered using a "good
faith" standard, but ultimately rejected it for fear that it could be misin-
terpreted as requiring no more than a test of the subjective state of mind
of the physicians conducting the peer review activity.80 Instead, they
settled upon the more objective "reasonable belief" test, which "will be
satisfied if the reviewers, with the information available to them at the
time of the professional review action, would reasonably have concluded
that their action would restrict incompetent behavior or would protect
patients."'" While this standard will be more difficult to meet than one
requiring only good faith, the statute provides a presumption that all pro-
fessional review actions are taken with the reasonable belief that they will
further the attainment of quality health care, unless a plaintiff can rebut
the presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. However, it is im-
portant to note that the statute does not provide absolute immunity. If a
jury concludes that a peer review body had disciplined a doctor in order
175. Id.
176. Health Care Quality Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11112 (1986).
177. Id. Section 11111 (immunity for participants).
178. Id. Sections 11132-11135.
179. Id. Section llll1(c); see HCQIA: CA Doctors Decide to Opt Out, HOSPITALS, July 5, 1988
at 56 [hereinafter CA Doctors Opt Out].
180. H.R. REP. No. 903, supra note 173, at 10.
181. Id. at 6393.
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to eliminate a competitor, it can award antitrust damages. 182
The statute also outlines the steps necessary to ensure a fair hearing
during peer review. 18 Among other requirements, the physician must be
given notice of the proposed action and the reasons therefore,18 4 and
must be informed of his right to request a hearing on the proposed
action. 185
The requirements relating to the conduct of hearings are more diffi-
cult to satisfy. The statute offers three alternatives from which to choose
the composition of the hearing board: (1) an arbitrator mutually accepta-
ble to the physician and the health care entity; 8 6 (2) a hearing officer
who is appointed by the entity and who is not in direct economic compe-
tition with the physician involved;187 (3) a panel of individuals who are
appointed by the entity and are not in direct economic competition with
the physician involved.' Standard due process rights such as the right
to representation by counsel, to have a record made of the proceedings,
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses, are also required by the
statute. 189
In some settings, it will be difficult, if not impossible to find a hear-
ing officer or panel of individuals who are not in "direct economic com-
petition with the physician involved." 9' This is especially true with peer
review activity taking place in a small hospital or medical community.19'
According to a chief of obstetries/gynecology at such a hospital,
"[a]ttempts at constructive criticism turned confrontational. I felt I was
in a situation where there was no way out."' 92 Another obstetrician/gyn-
ecologist agreed that "[w]hen you work in a small hospital, it's difficult to
blow the whistle on your peers."' 93 It was precisely this dilemma which
contributed to the trouble in which the Astoria Clinic found itself in Pat-
rick v. Burget. 94
182. Savage, Peer Review Teams That Censure Doctors Can Be Sued for Damages, Justices Hold,
L.A. Times, May 17, 1988, § 1, at 12, col. 1.
183. Health Care Quality Improvement Act, Section 11112(a).
184. Health Care Quality Improvement Act, Section 111 12(b)(1)(A)(i), (ii).
185. Id. § 1112(b)(1)(B)(1).
186. Id. § 111 12(b)(3)(A)(i).
187. Id. § 11112(b)(3)(A)(ii).
188. Id. § 11112(b)(3)(A)(iii).
189. See id. § 11112(b)(3) (C) (1)-(v).
190. Id. § 11112(b)(3)(A) (ii)-(iii).
191. Koska, ACOG Program Eases Peer Review Conflicts, HOSPITALS, April 20, 1988, at 58.
192. Id.; see also Holthaus, Federal Law Offers Protection for Peer Review, HOSPITALS, July 5,
1988, at 46. For potential solutions to this problem, see infra notes 194-215 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 114-72 and accompanying text.
194. CA Doctors Opt Out, supra note 179, at 56.
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IV. SOLUTIONS, ALTERNATIVES, AND CONCLUSIONS
Although advocates of peer review predicted dire consequences for
their cause as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Patrick v.
Burget, the case must be kept in perspective. The Court's ruling was ex-
tremely narrow: although it determined that Oregon's laws did not con-
fer immunity on its peer reviewers, the Court was only considering the
laws of one state. Other states, with different state statutes, or with the
federal HCQIA, may have incited a different result under circumstances
otherwise identical to those in Patrick.
The Supreme Court's holding is most useful for the message it con-
veys regarding the degree of state supervision it expects before it will
declare an activity immune under the state action doctrine. In addition to
heeding this message, there are a number of steps that state legislatures
and health care entities can take to protect peer review boards from anti-
trust liability.
States that have elected to opt out of the HCQIA would be well-
advised to ensure that their immunity provisions are airtight. California,
for example, has decided to opt out. According to the California Medical
Association, the state has a "good system of immunity that has been
tested in court. There isn't much of an advantage for us to opt into the
HCQIA." 195 States that opt out should bear in mind that peer review
activities mandated by individual statutes are still susceptible to lawsuits
brought against them under state law.1 9 6 The language of their laws
should leave no doubt that the state legislature has made a decision to
allow private parties to engage in behavior that would be considered an-
ticompetitive under ordinary circumstances because of other overriding
policy considerations.
States that opt out have the advantage of being able to tailor their
requirements for enabling a peer review body to discipline a physician.
Statutes should provide ample due process safeguards, including the
right to adequate notice, a written record of the proceedings, counsel,
and confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses, among
others. If a state sincerely intends to protect the activities of peer review
boards, so that they may conduct their investigations free from the fear
195. Id. But see Physician Wins Reinstatement of Sherman Act Conspiracy Claim, Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) Vol. 57, No. 1428 at 190 (Aug. 10, 1989) (physician who alleged that
suspension of his staff privileges violated the Sherman Act won a reprieve from the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which held that the challenged conduct was not shielded by the state
action doctrine. Pinhas v. Summit Health, Ltd., No. 87-6530 (9th Cir. July 26, 1989)).
196. See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
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of expensive and lengthy antitrust litigation, then its laws should reflect
standards of evidence and burdens of proof that facilitate this goal. For
example, a state might require that peer review activity be conducted in
"good faith," the standard that was rejected by the federal legislation in
favor of the more stringent "reasonable belief" standard.1 97
One problem with opting out of the federal statute, however, is that
unless a state has immunity provisions that have already proven success-
ful in court, there is no guarantee that they will withstand a challenge to
the state action doctrine. A state legislature may have intended to sup-
plant competition with state regulation, but it may not have succeeded in
conveying that intent in the language of its statutes. For example, the
state action doctrine was rejected as an affirmative defense in a 1986 Del-
aware medical staff privilege case, Quinn v. Kent General Hospital. 198 The
court in Quinn conceded that state law provided immunity from liability
to individual members of peer review boards for "good faith" actions
taken during review proceedings, 99 but rejected the contention that the
state action doctrine shielded them from antitrust attack. The state did
not mandate the creation of such boards, nor did it supervise review ac-
tivities.2 °" As the Delaware court interpreted the "clear articulation"
test:
[It] is true that the ... test does not require that the legislature 'expressly
state in a statute or its legislative history that it intends for the delegated
action to have anticompetitive effects,' . . . [but] there is not even a hint in
the Delaware statute that the peer review process will be promoted by con-
ferring a monopoly upon those physicians with entrenched positions on
hospital staffs. Nor is there any reason why promotion of the peer review
process should require any additional restriction of competition.201
Federal courts can also play an important role in ensuring the suc-
cess of state action immunity for peer review boards operating pursuant
197. 617 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Del. 1985).
198. Id. at 1234. According to the Delaware statute:
The Board of Medical Practice, the Medical Society of Delaware, their members, or the
members of any committees appointed thereby, and members of... a professional stan-
dards review committee or organization established under federal law (or other peer
review committee or organization) ... shall not be subject to, and shall be immune from
claim, suit, liability, damages or any other recourse, civil or criminal, arising from any
act or... decision or determination undertaken... or recommendation made so long as
such member acted in good faith ....
24 DEL. CODE ANN. § 1768(a) (1981).
199. Quinn v. Kent General Hosp., 617 F. Supp. at 1234.
200. Id. at 1240.
201. Id. at 1239 (citations omitted).
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to state statutes. The courts can simply dismiss2 "2 antitrust claims if the
state legislature has clearly expressed an interest in conferring state ac-
tion immunity.203 The courts can also impose sanctions on attorneys who
insist on bringing such suits in federal court despite the state legislature's
intent.2 4
In addition, the courts, themselves, may qualify as an appropriate
supervisory authority for the purposes of the "active state supervision"
requirement. According to the Eleventh Circuit in Bolt v. Halifax Hospi-
tal Medical Center:205
The purpose of the active state supervision requirement is to ensure that the
conduct in question is in fact the product of state regulation. A state may
choose to regulate private economic activity through a state agency; it may
just as readily choose to regulate such activity through its courts. Indeed,
regulation through the judiciary may be more likely to ensure accurate im-
plementation of the state's policy, for courts are especially well suited to
divine, interpret, and enforce legislative policy.20 6
Hospitals, themselves, can also protect and promote their peer re-
view activities. Hospital bylaws should provide for fair hearings with due
process safeguards, which must be adhered to strictly and applied evenly
to everyone. According to one health law expert, "It]he best evidence
you're following good faith is that you're following the rules."20 7
One way in which hospitals can solve the problem of finding peer
reviewers who are not in direct economic competition with the subject of
a review is to enlist an outside, impartial peer review team. Such a pro-
gram was formulated by the American College of Obstetricians and Gy-
necologists (ACOG) in 1986 in order to avoid the personal and legal
conflicts that can arise from peer review, especially in the setting of a
small health care facility.20 One drawback of such an approach is its
cost: the ACOG program charges $20,000 to $25,000 for a team of three
202. Battaglia, The State of Peer Review in Delaware Today, DEL. MED. J., April, 1988, at 238.
203. See Marrese v. Interqual, 748 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3501 (1985).
204. Id.
205. 851 F.2d 1273 (1lth Cir. 1988). But see Shahawy v. Harrison, 875 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir.
1989) (applying the Supreme Court's analysis in Patrick v. Burget, the Court of Appeals held that
state action doctrine does not shield a Florida hospital from antitrust claim of physician denied
privileges because neither a state agency nor the state judiciary actively supervises the peer review
process).
206. Id. at 1282.
207. Holthaus, Federal Law Offers Protection for Peer Review, HosPiTALs, July.5, 1988, at 46;
see also Proper Procedures Are Key to Review Legality Experts Say, HOSPITALS, June 20, 1988, at 65
[hereinafter Proper Procedures].
208. Koska, supra note 191, at 58.
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physicians and one nurse to visit a hospital and conduct a peer review.20 9
However, when compared to the potential price of an antitrust suit
brought by a disgruntled physician, the money may be well spent.210
A similar approach to ensuring impartial peer review is to institute a
proctoring system within the hospital.21' Proctoring involves an objective
evaluation of a physician's clinical competence by a monitor, or proctor,
who represents and is responsible to the medical staff.212 Proctors may be
particularly appropriate in evaluating new applicants to a hospital. 213
Proctors will actually observe the new physician performing procedures,
and will discuss the applicant's proposed treatment plans for particular
patients.
The California Medical Association (CMA) has recommended that
all medical staff institutes implement proctoring systems in their hospi-
tals.214 The CMA's guidelines for establishing a successful system require
inclusion of proctoring rules in the hospital's bylaws, and the careful se-
lection of a proctor who is free from conflict of interest. If necessary, the
proctor can be "borrowed" from another hospital or county medical so-
ciety. In addition, the CMA recommends that proctors not receive a fee
for their services.215
Because of the unique nature of medicine-including factors such as
the traditional independence accorded the regulation of physicians by
their peers, and the presence of insurance companies as third-party
payors-the profession as an industry does not respond neatly to tradi-
tional economic forces. Nor does it fit into a tidy antitrust package. It is
contradictory, at best, to insist in one breath that physicians must moni-
tor their colleagues, and then in another breath to allow disciplined phy-
sicians to sue their reviewers.
209. Id.
210. In 1981, for example, a Pennsylvania hospital spent over two million dollars in a successful
defense against a surgeon who sued on antitrust grounds after his staff privileges were revoked. Otto,
Flam & Silverman, An Approach to Limiting Antitrust Review of Hospital Peer Review Decisions, 55
INS. COUNSEL J. 457, 462 n.38 (1986).
211. Baker, Taking Care of the Doctors: The Hospital's Duty to Evaluate, Monitor, and Disci-
pline its Medical Staff, 13 JOURNAL OF QUALITY ASSURANCE-QUALITY REVIEW BULLETIN, 88
(1987); Is There a Proctor in the House?, HOSPITALS, June 20, 1988, at 65 [hereinafter Proctor in the
House]. Baker cautions that the proctor's role must be carefully limited and described in order to
avoid liability for breach of a potential duty of care owed to the patients of the physician being
evaluated. Baker, at 89-90.
212. Proctor in the House, supra note 211, at 65.
213. Baker, supra note 211, at 89.




The treble damages that accompany antitrust liability are grossly
out of proportion to offenses that a peer review body attempting to per-
form its function can commit, and may result in harm that far outweighs
its potential deterrent effect.2 16 If a peer review board misbehaves or vio-
lates the trust that the public has placed in it to fairly and honestly evalu-
ate its profession, other avenues of redress exist. Individuals with
legitimate grievances can bring suit in state court for loss of income or
other remedies that may accompany a finding that a state law was
violated.
Peer review boards should not be given free reign to do whatever
they please; Patrick v. Burget is evidence of the kind of abuse that such
boards are capable of. However, it is also evidence of a situation in which
legitimate peer review could have saved lives. The whole point of peer
review seems to have become obscured amidst the accusations of an-
ticompetitive conspiratorial activity. The fact remains that Dr. Patrick
committed serious, avoidable errors that cost patients their lives.217 The
fact also remains that other doctors in the community committed simi-
larly egregious acts which went unpunished.218 From a simplistic eco-
nomic perspective, the unequal treatment of doctors in this community
was admittedly unfair. The point that is so easily forgotten, however, is
that the primary purpose of peer review is to protect the patient, not the
doctor.
VALERIE S. BIEBUYCK
216. See Noble, supra note 135, March 13, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 1. The contentious atmosphere
caused by the Patrick litigation drove many people to seek medical care hours away from Astoria,
where doctors were not distracted by infighting.
217. See supra notes 125-43 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 150-56 and accompanying text.
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